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Statistics and the Law:
Hypothesis Testing and Its
Application to Title VII Cases
By Louis J. BRAUN*
Statistics1 form a useful tool in the determination of whether
defendants in a Title VII action2 have engaged in employment dis-
crimination.3 Statistics also can determine whether disparities in
the form of an underrepresentation of minority group members in
particular jobs or differences in pay, benefits, or conditions of em-
* Associate Professor of Mathematics and Statistics, Pace University, New York, New
York. B.A., 1963, New York University;, Ph.D., 1971, City University of New York.
The author wishes to thank Donald H. Zeigler and Donald L. Doernberg, Associate
Professors of Law, Pace University School of Law, for their helpful suggestions in the prepa-
ration of this Article.
1. Statistics may be defined loosely as the collection, correlation, and interpretation of
data. For a detailed explanation of statistical analysis see, D. HUNTSBERGER, D. CROFT & P.
BILLINOSLEY, STATISTICAL INFERENCE FOR MANAGEMENT AND ECONOMICS (2d ed. 1980) [here-
inafter cited as HUNTSBERGER].
2. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-
17 (1976 & Supp. H 1978), makes it unlawful for an employer "to fail or refuse to hire or to
discharge any individual or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to
his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individ-
ual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin .... ." Id. § 2000e-2(a)(i). In addition to
governmental agencies and departments, private parties have causes of action under Title
VII that allow them to recover damages for injuries sustained as a result of discriminatory
treatment directed against them as employees or potential employees. See Johnson v. Good-
year Tire & Rubber Co., 491 F.2d 1364 (5th Cir. 1974).
3. See, e.g., Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321 (1977) (hiring practices); T.I.M.E.-
D.C., Inc. v. United States, 431 U.S. 324 (1977) (hiring and promotion practices); Interna-
tional Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324 (1977) (hiring and promotion prac-
tices); Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971) (hiring and transfer policies); Donald-
son v. Pillsbury Co., 554 F.2d 825 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 856 (1977) (layoff and
termination policies); EEOC v. Local 14, Int'l Union of Operating Eng'rs, 553 F.2d 251 (2d
Cir. 1977) (union membership policies); Wetzel v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 508 F.2d 239 (3d
Cir.), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 1011 (1975) (promotion practices); Pettway v. American Cast
Iron Pipe Co., 494 F.2d 211 (5th Cir. 1974) (promotion and transfer policies); Jones v. Lee
Way Motor Freight, Inc., 431 F.2d 245 (10th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 954 (1971)
(promotion and transfer policies); Johnson v. University of Pittsburgh, 359 F. Supp. 1002
(W.D. Pa. 1973) (layoff and termination policies).
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ployment can be attributed solely to chance factors. Plaintiffs
often have relied on statistical analysis to meet the initial burden
of establishing a prima facie case of discrimination.4 Defendants
too have used statistics to show, among other things, that the em-
ployment practices which are alleged to be discriminatory
amounted to bona fide job requirements5 or to rebut the statistical
evidence offered by plaintiffs.6 In International Brotherhood of
Teamsters v. United States,1 the Supreme Court recognized the
importance of statistical analysis in cases in which the existence of
discrimination is a disputed issue.8 Furthermore, statistics showing
an extraordinarily small number of minority employees have been
held to establish a violation of Title VII as a matter of law.9
Some courts nevertheless have shown a reluctance to use sta-
tistics in employment discrimination cases, either because they did
not understand the analysis, found the theory too complicated,10 or
4. In McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973), the Court held that
in a private Title VII action, the plaintiff will satisfy the burden of establishing a prima
facie case of discrimination if he or she shows: "(i) that he belongs to a racial minority; (ii)
that he applied and was qualified for a job for which the employer was seeking applicants;
(iii) that, despite his qualifications, he was rejected; and (iv) that, after his rejection, the
position remained open and the employer continued to seek applicants from persons of com-
plainant's qualifications." In subsequent cases, courts have held that the plaintiff need not
have applied for the position if he or she can show that, given the defendant's conduct, such
an act would be futile. See, e.g., Rodriguez v. East Texas Motor Freight Sys., Inc., 505 F.2d
40, 55 (5th Cir. 1974), vacated on other grounds, 431 U.S. 395 (1977).
In such "disparate treatment" cases, proof of the defendant's discriminatory motive is
critical although it may be inferred from the mere fact of differences in treatment. See
International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 355 n.15 (1977). However,
courts also have held that prima facie cases of employment discrimination can be estab-
lished, by both private and governmental plaintiffs, by showing that the defendant's policies
had a "disparate impact" on minorities without having to prove that the defendant in-
tended to discriminate. Id. Disparate impact analysis focuses on the consequences of the
defendant's employment practices, not the motives behind them.
A prima facie case of discrimination can be established by statistical evidence alone.
Rodriguez v. East Texas Motor Freight Sys., Inc., 505 F.2d 40, 53 (5th Cir. 1974), vacated on
other grounds, 431 U.S. 395 (1977). In disparate impact cases, where the motives of the
defendants are irrelevant, statistics can be especially useful in establishing a prima facie
case of discrimination. See, e.g., Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321 (1977); Griggs v. Duke
Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
5. See, e.g., Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321 (1977); Spurlock v. United Airlines,
Inc., 475 F.2d 216 (10th Cir. 1972).
6. See, e.g., Hazelwood School Dist. v. United States, 433 U.S. 299 (1977); Ochoa v.
Monsanto Co., 335 F. Supp. 53 (S.D. Tex. 1971), aff'd, 473 F.2d 318 (5th Cir. 1973).
7. 431 U.S. 324 (1977).
8. Id. at 339.
9. Parham v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 433 F.2d 421, 426 (8th Cir. 1970).
10. See, e.g., Allen v. City of Mobile, 331 F. Supp. 1134, 1139 n.14 (S.D. Ala. 1971).
[Vol. 32
STATISTICS AND THE LAW
because the results were not grounded in absolute certainty.11 Even
those courts accepting statistical analysis, but forced to rely on the
interpretations and understandings of expert witnesses, sometimes
express a wariness and discomfort in using statistics to resolve le-
gal issues.12 In International Brotherhood of Teamsters, for exam-
ple, the Court stated: "We caution only that statistics are not irref-
utable; they come in infinite variety and, like any other kind of
evidence, they may be rebutted. In short, their usefulness depends
on all of the surrounding facts and circumstances." 3 Although sta-
tistics can be misused in developing an aura of support for a posi-
tion not supportable by the evidence,1 4 rather than bar or severely
curtail its use, steps can and should be taken to impose restrictions
which would disallow its improper use only. If the rudiments of
statistical analysis were understood by the courts, they would have
a better perception of what constitutes its proper use and could
exercise a more constructive control over its admissibility as
evidence.
This Article discusses a limited but central area of statistical
anaylsis applicable to Title VII cases.1 5 Although the techniques
and theories developed herein all have been used by expert wit-
nesses in such cases, their synthesis into a cohesive theory of evi-
dence should foster a greater understanding and thus a more pro-
ductive use of statistics in employment discrimination litigation.
The focus of the Article will be on the field of statistical analy-
sis known as hypothesis testing,16 with an initial discussion of the
problems in determining the proper population of available em-
11. See, e.g., Chance v. Board of Examiners, 458 F.2d 1167, 1173 (2d Cir. 1972).
12. A large measure of the distrust with which courts often view statistics stems from
the popular reputation of statistics as being an analytical device that can be used to twist
the truth and prove whatever it is one wants to prove. See, e.g., D. HuFF, How To LIE WrrH
STATISTIcs (1954).
13. 431 U.S. at 340.
14. See HUNTSBERGER, supra note 1, at 4-8.
15. This Article is not intended to offer a complete and detailed account of each and
every statistical technique that can be used in a Title VII action, but rather to present and
explain the most useful of the analytical techniques which apply to such cases. Thus far, the
major cases in employment discrimination which turned on statistical evidence could all
have been analyzed using the techniques contained herein. Nor are the techniques devel-
oped in this Article restricted to use in Title VII actions only. They can be used in such
disparate fields as antitrust litigation, environmental law, drug effectiveness cases, and dis-
puted election actions.
16. See J. FREUND & F. WILLws, ELEmrr A Y BusnmEss STA'TISTcs-THE MODERN
APPROACH, chs. 12-14 (3d ed. 1977) [hereinafter cited as FnEurm & WILAmsS]. See also
HUNTSBERGER, supra note 1, at chs. 9-11.
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ployees or "qualified labor pool" to be used in the analysis. The
Article will develop methodology and mathematical techniques rel-
evant to the determination of whether a proper proportion17 of a
certain minority is represented in the employ of a given company,
or whether the differences between the proportions or mean18 sala-
ries, increments, or tenure without promotion of various groups of
people employed in given jobs are significant enough to warrant an
inference of discrimination. Rather detailed but fundamental
mathematical analysis is presented throughout this Article which
should aid in fostering an understanding helpful both to potential
litigants and to the courts in their use of statistics.
Populations
Two methods by which a plaintiff in a Title VII action may
use statistical analysis to establish a prima facie case of discrimina-
tion in employment are: (1) demonstrating that the proportion of
minority employees in a defendant company working in particular
jobs is significantly smaller than the proportion of minority mem-
bers in the general population able to do those jobs 9 and (2) show-
ing that a defendant employer's hiring or promotion criteria dis-
criminate against a given minority by excluding or disqualifying a
greater proportion of its members than other groups within the
population of qualified workers. 20 A defendant attempting to rebut
such arguments and evidence may challenge the plaintiff's basis for
establishing the population of available employees. 21 Defining the
17. A "proportion" is a ratio, x/n, where x is the number of observations describing a
given event, and n is the total number of observations. A proportion also can be given as a
decimal or a percentage. For example, if there are 100 women in a work force of 2,000 the
proportion of women in that work force is: 100/2,000 = 0.05 = 5%.
18. A "mean" is an average. It is computed by adding the given arithmetic observa-
tions and then dividing by the total number of such observations. For example, if $5.65,
$5.93, $6.07, and $5.75 were the hourly rates of pay for the four workers on a given assembly
line, the mean hourly rate would be:
$(5.65 + 5.93 + 6.07 + 5.75) = $23.40 = $5.85.
4 4
19. See, e.g., EEOC v. Local 14, Int'l Union of Operating Eng'rs, 553 F.2d 251 (2d Cir.
1977); Wetzel v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 508 F.2d 239 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 1011
(1975).
20. See, e.g., Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321 (1977); Griggs v. Duke Power Co.,
401 U.S. 424 (1971).
21. See, e.g., EEOC v. Local 14, Int'l Union of Operating Eng'rs, 553 F.2d 251 (2d Cir.
1977); Ste. Marie v. Eastern R.R. Ass'n, 458 F. Supp. 1147 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
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relevant population thus can be central to the issue of discrimina-
tion and is often a matter of contention between the parties. In
HazeIwood School District v. United States,2 for example, the
plaintiff successfully had established a prima facie case of employ-
ment discrimination by demonstrating that there was a significant
disparity between the proportions of black teachers in the Hazel-
wood school system and the population of teachers in the St. Louis
metropolitan area in which Hazelwood is located. The defendant
successfully argued before the Supreme Court that the city of St.
Louis should possibly be excised from this population which would
result in the elimination of a large portion of black teachers from
consideration and bring the relevant proportions generally into
proper alignment. The Court therefore vacated the appellate court
decision, remanding the case to the trial court for a determination
of the appropriate comparative population.2 s
The two major criteria used in determining the population of
available employees for a specific job have been the job qualifica-
tions including the skills, talents, or abilities needed to perform the
job and the geographic area from which the employees are drawn.
Absent a showing of special job qualifications, the population is
determined 'by considering only the appropriate geographic area
and including all persons in the employable age bracket living
within that area.2 If, however, the jobs in question could be filled
only by highly trained individuals or persons with special talents
or abilities, the dominant criterion then would be the job qualifica-
tions,25 and a geographic limitation may not even be considered. 2
In these circumstances, the appropriateness of job qualifications
must be addressed on a case by case basis and often is a central
issue in the action.2 "
The determination of the appropriate geographic area to be
used in defining the relevant population also has been approached
on a case by case basis. Courts have used a variety of measures in
22. 433 U.S. 299 (1977).
23. Id. at 310-13.
24. See, e.g., New Orleans Pub. Sem., Inc. v. Brown, 507 F.2d 160 (5th Cir. 1975).
25. See, e.g., Hester v. Southern Ry. Co., 497 F.2d 1374, 1379 n.6 (5th Cir. 1974); Spur-
lock v. United Airlines, Inc., 475 F.2d 216 (10th Cr. 1973).
26. See Pace College v. Commission on Human Rights, 38 N.Y.2d 28, 36-37, 339
N.E.2d 880, 883-84, 377 N.Y.S.2d 471, 476-77 (1975).
27. See, e.g., Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321 (1977); Griggs v. Duke Power Co.,
401 U.S. 424 (1971); Spurlock v. United Airlines, Inc., 475 F.2d 216 (10th Cir. 1973).
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defining the relevant geographic areas, including political subdivi-
sions,28 metropolitan areas,2 9 and the jurisdictions or areas served
by the defendants8 0 To avoid the potential inconsistencies in such
an ad hoc approach, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commis-
sion (EEOC) has designated the "Standard Metropolitan Statisti-
cal Area"31 (SMSA) as the geographic area to be used in Title VII
actions. The SMSA may be a useful geographic parameter if the
locus of employment is at or near its center; however, its usefulness
diminishes as this locus is moved closer to its edges. A defendant
company'on a boundary of an SMSA will not draw employees from
the distant parts of the region except under the rarest of circum-
stances. Conversely, the company probably would draw part of its
workforce from neighboring towns and counties that are not a part
of the SMSA.32 Although many courts now are adopting the SMSA
as the geographic area of the population,"3 its acceptance is by no
28. See, e.g., Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971) (state); Parham v. South-
western Bell Tel. Co., 433 F.2d 421 (8th Cir. 1970) (state); Rogers v. International Paper
Co., 510 F.2d 1340 (8th Cir.), vacated and remanded on other grounds, 423 U.S. 809 (1975)
(county); Brown v. Gaston County Dyeing Mach. Co. 457 F.2d 1377 (4th Cir.), cert. denied,
409 U.S. 982 (1972) (county); New Orleans Pub. Serv., Inc. v. Brown, 507 F.2d 160 (5th Cir.
1975) (city); United States v. Ironworkers Local 86, 443 F.2d 544 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 404
U.S. 984 (1971) (city).
29. See, e.g., Detroit Police Officers' Ass'n v. Young, 446 F. Supp. 979, 995-96 (E.D.
Mich. 1978), rev'd, 608 F.2d 671 (6th Cir. 1979); Abron v. Black & Decker Mfg. Co., 439 F.
Supp. 1095, 1105 (D. Md. 1977).
30. See, e.g., Rule v. Ironworkers Local 396, 568 F.2d 558 (8th Cir. 1977); Sears v.
Atcheson, T. & S.F. Ry., 454 F. Supp. 158 (D. Kan. 1978).
31. SMSAs are geographic units developed by the Office of Management and the
Budget (OMB) comprising cities, towns, and counties in and around major United States
cities.
32. For example, the New York City SMSA includes Westchester and Putnam Coun-
ties, New York in the north and Brooklyn, New York in the south. For an employee living in
Brooklyn to commute the 60'plus miles by auto to a plant in northern Westchester or Put-
nam during the rush hours would take at least two and one-half hours one way, assuming
only normal delays. If the employee was to attempt to commute by rail, he or she would first
have to get to a subway station (usually by bus), take the subway to Grand Central Station
(which may involve transferring trains), take the railroad train to the Westchester or Put-
nam stop, and finally take a taxi to the place of employment. This trip easily could ap-
proach three hours in duration even assuming no delays and efficient connections. Con-
versely, a worker living in the non-SMSA counties of Orange or Sullivan, New York would
be within a reasonable commuting distance from a worksite in northern Westchester or
Putnam.
33. In the rare instances where the place of employment is not located within an
SMSA, the EEOC uses the "Economic Area" (EA), which is a geographic unit similarly
defined along county lines. See The BEA Economic Areas: Structural Changes and Growth
1950-1973, SURVEY oF CuRmEr Busims (Nov. 11, 1975).
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means universal,3 4 nor is its accuracy unassailable.
The problem inherent in the use of SMSAs was demonstrated
in Abron v. Black & Decker Mfg. Co.35 The court in Abron rejected
the defendant's contention that the geographic area to be used in
defining the relevant population should be the area within a
twenty mile radius of the plant in favor of the SMSA of Baltimore,
Maryland.36 The court concluded that the defendant had engaged
in employment discrimination despite substantial evidence that
the SMSA did not accurately reflect the geographic area in which
the Black & Decker workforce resided.$'
Although exclusive reliance on the SMSA to define the geo-
graphic area of the relevant population when dealing with compa-
nies located in or near major United States cities may lead to in-
equitable results, continuing to determine these areas on an ad hoc
basis easily could lead to inconsistent results on similar facts. For
example, had the court in Abron accepted the defense contention
that the appropriate geographic area should be defined as that
within a twenty mile radius of the Black & Decker plant, it proba-
bly would have found no case of employment discrimination had
been established.
A uniform approach for determining the geographic area of
the population of available employees that avoids inflexible stan-
dards which may be inapplicable to the facts of an individual case,
as demonstrated by the use of the SMSA, yet offers predictability
of result and consistency of decision may be established by the use
of a single mathematical formula. To be accepted by the courts,
the formula would have to be simple to apply and reflect ade-
quately the relative mobility of the workforce in the specific re-
gions in question.
Absent natural geographic criteria,38 the dominant factor to be
34. See cases cited in notes 28-29 supra.
35. 439 F. Supp. 1095 (D. Md. 1977).
36. Id. at 1105.
37. Id. This evidence indicated that- (1) 85% of the Black and Decker workforce re-
sided within a twenty mile radius of the plant; (2) no direct public transportation existed
between major intersections in Baltimore and the plant (25 to 30 miles in distance); and (3)
blacks in the region were less likely to own cars than whites.
38. Such criteria would include state or municipal requirements of residence as a con-
dition of employment. Also, if the wages paid in one state were significantly higher than the
wages paid in an adjacent state for comparable work done, the common state boundary
would act as a natural geographic boundary for the labor pool availability area. See, e.g.,
United States v. County of Fairfax, 19 FEP Cases 753 (E.D. Va. 1979).
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considered by such a formula is the distance traveled by the
workforce to the place of employment measured in terms of either
miles or time. 9 The time, effort, and expense of a commute is gen-
erally a major consideration of a potential employee in deciding
whether to apply for or accept a particular job.4 ° It would not be
much of an improvement over the SMSA, however, to draw a circle
of a given radius centered at the place of employment and label
that region the geographic area. Such a construct is too rigid, elim-
inating from consideration those potential employees who would
be willing to commute to work from locations outside of the con-
structed area; it also fails to consider that the highway network or
mass transit facilities in the region may make it faster and easier
to commute to the worksite from specific locations outside the cir-
cle than from some locations within it. 41
Taking into account all of the above considerations, the geo-
graphic area of the population of available employees should be
the aggregate or union of every city, town, and county in which a
given percentage of the populace resides within a specified dis-
tance from the place of employment.42 The demographic informa-
tion is readily available, the construction is not difficult, and it al-
lows for uniformity without sacrificing adequate consideration of
relevant individual factors. The construct resembles that of an
SMSA except that the focus or "practical center" is the place of
employment, not a major city.43 By requiring only a percentage of
the populace of a city, town, or county to reside within a given
39. In urban areas, traffic congestion and mass transit facilities affect the correlation
between miles traveled and time spent in transit. In these locales, it is more appropriate to
measure commuting distances in terms of time. However, the cost of commuting, either by
auto or rail, cannot be ignored because it generally is determined outside central cities ac-
cording to the miles traveled. In rural areas where traffic congestion and mass transit are
not major factors influencing commuting, the classical measure of distance in miles should
serve well.
40. See, e.g., EEOC v. North Hills Passavant Hosp., 466 F. Supp. 783 (W.D. Pa. 1979);
United States v. County of Fairfax, 19 FEP Cases 753 (E.D. Va. 1979).
41. For example, in the New York metropolitan area, it takes 45 minutes to commute
from White Plains to midtown Manhattan, a distance of more than 20 miles, while it takes
over one hour to commute from the Canarsie section of Brooklyn to midtown, a distance of
less than 15 miles.
42. A reasonable choice would be the union of all political subdivisions where more
than two-thirds of the populace live within a one hour and a 40-mile commute to the place
of employment, thus taking into account both distance and time. Whatever measures finally
are adopted, however, should be accepted uniformly so as to promote consistency and order.
43. Thus, under this construction, a worksite in Manhattan would be expected to draw
employees from Brooklyn, while one in Putnam County would not. See note 32 supra.
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commuting distance from the worksite, consideration of potential
employees who would be willing to commute from locations outside
the region is to a large degree retained." This formula meets the
requirements of ease of construction and reasonableness, and if
adopted, should aid courts in determining the geographic area of
the population with a consistency previously lacking.
It should be noted, however, that this construction is not ap-
propriate in all cases. When the personnel needed are required to
possess such unique skills or talents that an employer is forced to
recruit outside such areas,'5 when the job itself entails moving
about with no central starting point for the employees,'4 or when a
town, city, or county within the constructed region has instituted a
program which would bias the results if included, 7 an alternate
construction would have to be considered. Under such circum-
stances an alternative generally would be apparent. 8
Statistical Foundation
Having defined a population of available employees, a compar-
ison can be made between that population and the defendant's
workforce, or among distinct groups within the defendant's
workforce, to determine whether any existing disparity in the
treatment of minority and nonminority workers is significant
enough to warrant an inference of discrimination. The law initially
presumes that no such disparity exists, and that any such differ-
ence is not significant enough to create an inference of discrimina-
tion. To counter this presumption and establish a prima facie case,
a plaintiff must first demonstrate that a disparity of treatment ex-
44. For example, if only 70% of the populace of Brooklyn resides within a specified
commuting distance to a given place of employment, all qualified individuals who live in
Brooklyn would be considered a part of the population of available employees, including
those who do not live within the specified commuting distance.
45. See, e.g., EEOC v. United Virginia Bank, 615 F.2d 147 (4th Cir. 1980); Hester v.
Southern Ry., 497 F.2d 1374 (5th Cir. 1974); Pace College v. Commission on Human Rights,
38 N.Y.2d 28, 36-37, 339 N.E.2d 880, 883-84, 377 N.Y.S.2d 471, 474-75 (1975). See text ac-
companying notes 25-27 supra.
46. See, e.g., Domingo v. New England Fish Co., 445 F. Supp. 421, 432-33 (W.D.
Wash. 1977).
47. See, e.g., Hazelwood School Dist. v. United States, 433 U.S. 299 (1977).
48. See, e.g., Hazelwood School Dist. v. United States, 433 U.S. 299 (1977) (vacating
534 F.2d 805 (8th Cir. 1976)); Domingo v. New England Fish Co., 445 F. Supp. 421 (W.D.
Wash. 1977); Pace College v. Commission on Human Rights, 38 N.Y.2d 28, 339 N.E.2d 880,
377 N.Y.S.2d 471 (1975).
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ists. If such a disparity is found, use of the statistical technique of
"hypothesis testing"'49 can determine whether this difference in
treatment is the result of discriminatory acts by the defendant.
The Null Hypothesis
When the law presumes that there is no significant difference
between, two or more statistical data groupings, as opposed to
presuming that such a difference does exist, it is formulating a null
hypothesis.50 A null hypothesis postulates equality rather than ine-
quality, presuming that whatever statistically demonstrated ine-
quality does exist is due to chance factors.5 It is mathematically
more straightforward to determine whether a null hypothesis
should be rejected as false by testing the degree of disparity
against the expected sampling error, than to determine the falsity
of a hypothesis that is not null. 52 Placing the burden on the plain-
tiff in a Title VII action to establish a prima facie case is function-
ally equivalent to assuming that there is no difference in the treat-
ment by the defendant of specified groups in its workforce-a null
hypothesis.
The alternate hypothesis to a null hypothesis postulates a dif-
ference between two or more statistical data groupings and may
take several forms. Given a null hypothesis that no difference ex-
ists between two arithmetic observations x and y (x = y), its nega-
tive could be: (1) the first observation is greater than the second
(x > y); (2) the first observation is less than the second (x < y); or
(3) the first observation is different from the second (x : y).
The formulation of an alternate hypothesis is important when
determining whether a defendant discriminated in violation of Ti-
tle VII inasmuch as rejection of a null hypothesis is statistically
equivalent to accepting a constructed alternative. Similarly, ac-
ceptance of the null hypothesis automatically means rejection of
any constructed alternative." For example, if the first observation
(x) is the proportion of blacks in the defendant's workforce, and
the second observation (y) is the proportion of blacks in the popu-
49. See note 16 supra.
50. For a more detailed description of the null hypothesis, see generally FREUND &
WILLIAMS, supra note 16, at 281; HUNTSBERGER, supra note 1, at 274-76.
51. E. BABBlE, SURVEY RESEARCH METHODS 309 (1973).
52. See FREuND & WmLLwAms, supra note 16, at 280-281.
53. Id. at 275-76, 283.
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lation of available employees, the three possible alternate hypothe-
ses would be: (1) the proportion of blacks in the defendant's
workforce is greater than the proportion of blacks in the popula-
tion of available employees (x > y); (2) the proportion of blacks in
the workforce is less than the proportion of blacks in the popula-
tion (x < y); and (3) the proportion of blacks in the workforce is
different from that in the population (x = y). Typically in Title
VII cases the court is concerned with the possibility of inadequate
minority representation in the workforce, focusing on alternate hy-
pothesis (2) rather than (1) or (3)." In such cases, a rejection of
the null hypothesis-that the proportion of blacks in the popula-
tion is generally reflected by the proportion of blacks in the
workforce-would be equivalent to accepting the proposition that
the proportion of blacks in the workforce is significantly smaller.
In a case of alleged reverse discrimination,"5 however, the alternate
hypothesis would be, for example, that the proportion of blacks in
the workforce is larger than that in the population.
Type I Error
Accepting or rejecting any hypothesis entails the risk of error.
Rejecting a hypothesis when it is in fact true is classified as a Type
I error.56 Demanding that a given hypothetical statement be ac-
cepted unless the weight of the evidence exceeds a selected thresh-
old limits the possibility of making such an error. The possibility
remains that a false hypothetical statement will be accepted as
true because the weight of the evidence presented falls below the
selected threshold.57 Because the presumption in Title VII cases is
that no discrimination exists (a null hypothesis) with the initial
burden on the plaintiff to disprove this proposition by a prepon-
derance of the evidence (a selected threshold), the courts appear
more reluctant to blame an employer who is actually not guilty of
discrimination (rejecting a true null hypothesis and making a Type
I error with respect to the innocence of the employer defendant)
54. See, e.g., Hazelwood School Dist. v. United States, 433 U.S. 299 (1977); Interna-
tional Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324 (1977).
55. See, e.g., Detroit Police Officers Ass'n v. Young, 446 F. Supp. 979 (E.D. Mich.
1978), rev'd, 608 F.2d 671 (6th Cir. 1979).
56. See FREUND & WmLLAms, supra note 16, at 276; HUNTSBERGER, supra note 1, at
277-78.
57. Accepting a false hypothesis is a Type II error. See FREUND & WILLIAMS, supra
note 16, at 276; HUNTSBERGER, supra note 1, at 277-78.
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than to exculpate a defendant who did discriminate unjustly."
Level of Significance
The question arises as to the degree of proof courts should re-
quire to reject a null hypothesis and hold that a plaintiff has estab-
lished a prima facie case of discrimination. Put another way, what
is the probability of error that courts should tolerate before finding
that discrimination exists? This tolerable possibility of making a
Type I error is called the level of significance,59 and is denoted by
the Greek letter alpha ( cc ). The choice of an cC value is one to be
made by the courts based on what they feel is an adequate thresh-
old for the burden of proof by a preponderence of the evidence.
The EEOC and some courts have settled on a level of 0.05.60
By this measure, the null hypothesis that a defendant did not dis-
criminate would be rejected in favor of the alternate hypothesis of
discrimination if there is less than a 5% (0.05) chance that the
rejection is an error. Thus, the plaintiff must establish that there is
at least a 95% chance that the defendant's actions were discrimi-
natory before the court will hold that a prima facie case has been
established by a preponderance of the evidence.
The Central Limit Theorem61
The techniques used to determine whether a null hypothesis
should be rejected, given a certain level of significance, are predi-
cated on the following statistical theory. 2 Given a large number"
of random samples" of equal and sufficient size 5 taken from a
58. This parallels the presumption in criminal cases that a defendant is innocent until
proven guilty.
59. See FREUND & WLLIAAs, supra note 16, at 283; HUNTSBERGER, supra note 1, at
278.
60. EEOC Guidelines on Employee Selection Procedure, 29 C.F.R. § 1607.14(B)(5)
(1979). See also Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 430, 437 (1975).
61. See FREUND & WILLIAMS, supra note 16, at 252; HUNTSBERGER, supra note 1, at
207-15.
62. See generally FREUND & WILLAMS, supra note 16, at 280-85.
63. This number is postulated to be large enough to accomplish the objectives to be
enunciated later in this discussion. Such a number exists in all cases to be considered.
64. A random sample is formed by selecting a given number of elements of the popula-
tion by procedures which ensure that no bias will ensue and that every distinct sample of
the given size has an equal chance of being selected. To construct a sample which purpose-
fully includes or excludes elements from given groups within the population, such as man-
dating that 50% of the sample taken be comprised of women or limiting the elements of the
sample to only a part of the geographical area of the population, creates a bias. Any results
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given population, a statistical parameter such as a mean,66 a pro-
portion, 7 or a standard deviation 8 is extracted from each sample.
These extracted bits of statistical data, when taken together, al-
ways are going to be "normally distributed,"6 9 and their mean will
be the statistical parameter of the given population. In addition,
the standard deviation of these extracted bits of data, called the
standard error of the relevant parameter, is given by means of its
own formula. 0
regarding characteristics of the population inferred from the data extracted from such a
sample are tainted. Some courts have been forced to grapple with the question of random-
ness of a sample and disregard testimony grounded in one found to be biased. See, eg.,
United States v. Georgia Power Co., 474 F.2d 906, 916 (5th Cir. 1973); Queen v. Dresser
Indus., Inc., 456 F. Supp. 257, 264-65 (D. Md. 1978).
65. Some courts have demonstrated a reluctance to admit evidence proffered from
samples which were small in size. See, e.g., Friend v. Leidinger, 446 F. Supp. 361, 366-67
(E.D. Va. 1977), aff'd, 588 F.2d 61 (4th Cir. 1978); Dendy v. Washington Hosp. Center, 431
F. Supp. 873, 876 (D.D.C. 1977); Johnson v. Shreveport Garment Co., 422 F. Supp. 526, 539-
40 (W.D. La. 1976), aff'd, 577 F.2d 1132 (5th Cir. 1978). But see Dendy v. Washington Hosp.
Center, 581 F.2d 990 (D.C. Cir. 1978). In remanding Dendy to the trial court, the court of
appeals stated: "While the testimony of plaintiff's statistician was uncontroverted, the court
held that it represents too slender a reed on which to rest the weighty remedy of prelimi-
nary relief.... While the numbers involved may have appeared small, statistical analysis
showed them to reflect a discriminatory impact that could not reasonably be ascribed to
chance alone." Id. at 992 (citations omitted). See also Chicano Police Officer's Ass'n v. Sto-
ver, 526 F.2d 431, 439 (10th Cir. 1975), vacated on other grounds, 426 U.S. 944 (1976),
"(The smallness of the sample should not be grounds here for rejecting the proof. If it were,
the tendency would be to deny employees in small plants the type of protection the civil
rights statutes afford)".
Small sized samples can indeed yield acceptable results under certain limiting circum-
stances. See FREUND & WILLIAMS, supra note 16, at 291-95; Comment, Differential Pass-
Fail Rates in Employment Testing: Statistical Proof Under Title VII, 91 HARv. L. REV.
793, 812-13 (1978).
66. See note 18 supra.
67. See note 17 supra.
68. A standard deviation measures the dispersion of a set of data. Its relative size
depends upon how widely the data is dispersed. If the data are closely bunched, the stan-
dard deviation is small; if the data are scattered, it would be fairly large. See FREUND &
WILLIA s, supra note 16, at 39, 45-46; HUNTSBERGER, supra note 1, at 46-51, 63-65.
69. A normal distribution can be viewed as the distribution of observations of re-
peated measurements of a given physical phenomenon. The scores in a normal distribution
congregate around the mean and taper off symmetrically as one moves further away from
the mean in either direction. See FREUND & WILLIAMS, supra note 16, at 224-25. An example
would be the distribution of the observed number of heads obtained by repeatedly flipping a
coin in the air 100 times. The first series of flips might produce 55 heads, the next series
might produce 47 heads, the next 44 heads, etc.. . . The numbers 55, 47, 44 ... would be
normally distributed. If the phenomenon in question either rarely or almost always occurs,
the distribution of observations of repeated measurements is not normal. See id at 189-91;
HUNTSBERGER, supra note 1, at 154-56 (a discussion of the Poisson distribution).
70. See FREUND & WILLIAMS, supra note 16, at 250, 292, 315, 332 (problem 5).
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Illustration 1: Assume that 250 employable adults are selected
randomly from a population and given a certain examination,
which 200 (80%) of them pass. Now assume that an6ther 250 em-
ployable adults are chosen at random and given the same examina-
tion and 185 (74%) pass. Continuing this process of choosing 250
employable adults, testing them, and recording the proportion that
pass, a large number of times, say 100,000, one would have 100,000
proportions extracted from the individual samples; 80% or 0.80
from the first, 74% or 0.74 from the second, and so forth. These
100,000 proportions would be normally distributed with their
mean:
0.80 + 0.74 + ...
p 100,000
being the actual proportion of adults in the population who would
have passed the examination had it been administered to each and
every one of them.7 1 Had another parameter such as the mean test
score of each group of 250 been extracted from each of the sam-
ples, the 100,000 sample means would be normally distributed, and
their mean would be the average test score which would have been
attained had the entire population of employable adults taken the
test.
z-scores
Practical considerations generally preclude examination of a
large number of individual samples and thus bits of data usually
are extracted from only one sample. However, the information
gained from examining one sample can be used to develop infor-
mation about the entire population from which it was extracted,
leading in turn to the probability that a given assertion regarding
this population is false.
The examined sample at hand can be construed as an element
of the set of all possible samples of like size that could be taken
from the given population. 2 For example, the first sample taken in
71. Unless an entire population is tested, the possibility always exists that the value p
will differ significantly from the true proportion of the population, but the chances of that
happening are infintesimal, about as great as a monkey sitting down by a typewriter and, by
randomly striking the keys, typing the text of the United States Constitution. It is not a
possibility given any consideration by statisticians.
72. If N is the size of a population, and n is the size of a sample to be extracted, then
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Illustration 1, which yielded a proportion of 80% passing, could be
viewed as an element of the set of the 100,000 such samples taken,
which are but a portion of all such samples which might have been
extracted from the given population. Similarly, a statistical param-
eter extracted from the sample at hand can be viewed as one of the
many such parameters embodied in each of the theoretically possi-
ble samples which are normally distributed. Thus, the 80% pro-
portion taken from the first sample in Illustration 1 can be viewed
as an element of the normally distributed set of all such propor-
tions which might have been taken from the theoretically possible
samples.
The measurements of the arithmetic data in a normal or near
normal distribution with a known mean and standard deviation
can be standardized into z-scores"5 or t-scores.7 After standard-
izing the measurement of a given bit of data in such a distribution,
it is possible to determine where it lies in relation to other bits of
data in the distribution, and thus determine the percentage of the
distribution's elements which fall below or lie above it. 5 In partic-
ular, it is possible to determine whether or not it lies in the top or
there are
N.(N- 1).(N- 2).(N- 3)...(N-n + 1)
n.(n - 1).(n - 2 ).(n - 3) ... 3.2.1
such samples. In reality, this is an astronomically large number. From a population of just
100, for example, over 75,000,000 samples of size 5 can be extracted.
73. The z-score of any data point x in a normal distribution is given by the formula:
x - mean
z - standard deviation
This formulation standardizes the measurements of data within any normal distribution by
assigning any data point to a value corresponding to the number of standard deviation units
it is removed from the mean. The distribution of z-scores also will be normal with a mean
value of zero and a standard deviation with measure one. Thus, a single group of calcula-
tions on z-scores will serve to provide results for any normally distributed set of data. See
FRtnuN & WLLIAMs, supra note 16, at 226-30; HuNTsBERGER, supra note 1, at 136-37.
74. When the samples in question are relatively small (for convenience, this generally
is construed to be samples of size 30 or less), the distribution is nearly, but not exactly
normal. FanuNN & WILLIAMS, supra note 16, at 266, 514. The size of the discrepancy de-
pends on one less the size of the samples considered (n - 1), called the number of "degrees
of freedom" of the distribution. To compensate for this discrepancy, a t-score rather than a
z-score is used. The use of a t-score allows for more latitude in the calculations. The t-score
for a given bit of data x is calculated in the same manner as a z-score:
= x - mean
x standard deviation
See id. at 266-68; HUNTSBERGMR, supra note 1, at 240-42. For a discussion of the appropri-
ateness of the use of small sized samples, see note 65 supra.
75. See FREuND & WILIAMs, supra note 16, at 226-28, 267.
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bottom 5% or 21/2 % of the distribution."6 Because the probability
that any one bit of randomly selected data possessing a given prop-
erty corresponds to the percentage of data points in the set with
that property," the probability that any data point taken at ran-
dom from a normal or near normal distribution is in the top or
bottom 5% or 21/2% of the distribution is 5% or 21/2%
respectively.
Test for Significance
Operating at a level of significance of 0.05,78 the validity of a
null hypothesis can be tested against an alternate hypothesis by
taking a random sample or samples from a population, extracting
the appropriate statistical parameters, calculating the relevant t-
or z-score, and determining whether it lies above or below the indi-
cated threshold value separating the region of acceptance of the
null hypothesis from the regions which prompt its rejection in
favor of the alternate. 9
76. The table in Appendix A lists the t-score threshold values through 29 degrees of
freedom, followed by the z-score threshold values separating the shaded 5% of the distribu-
tion from the unshaded 95%, pictured above the respective column listings.
Any bit of data with a t-score or a z-score greater than the appropriate threshold value
in columns I or IV lies in the shaded area indicating that it is in the top 5% or 2 % of the
distribution respectively, while a bit of data with a t- or z-score less than the appropriate
threshold value in columns II or I is in the bottom 5% or 21/2 % of the distribution respec-
tively. For example, given a sample of 16 observations whose mean has a t-score of 1.825,
one is able to determine that the sample's mean lies in the top 5% of the distribution be-
cause at 15 degrees of freedom (16 - 1), see note 74 supra, the appropriate threshold value
taken from column I in Appendix A is 1.753, which is less than 1.825. One also can conclude
that this sample's mean is not in the top 2 % of the distribution because 1.825 is not
greater than 2.131, the appropriate threshold value taken from column IV.
77. For example, the probability that a male will be selected at random from a group
consisting of 80% men and 20% women is 80%.
78. All illustrations and theory presented in this Article shall assume a level of signifi-
cance of 0.05, but similar tables to the one presented in Appendix A can be constructed for
any other level, and the procedures developed herein using the 0.05 level would hold for
these others as well.
79. It is the alternate hypothesis which determines the column in Appendix A from
which the appropriate threshold value(s) is extracted. If the alternate hypothesis postulates
that a sample parameter exceeds that of a population, or that a parameter of a first sample
exceeds that of a second, then the appropriate threshold value will be found in column L If
the relevant t- or z-score is greater than this value, then the null hypothesis is to be rejected
in favor of the alternate; otherwise it is to stand. Conversely, if the alternate hypothesis
postulates that a sample parameter falls below that of a population, or that a parameter of a
first sample is exceeded by that of a second, then the appropriate threshold value will be
found in column II in Appendix A, and if the t- or z-score falls below this value, the null
hypothesis is to be rejected in favor of the alternate. If it exceeds the threshold value, the
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Illustration 2: Assume that an employer claims that the aver-
age or mean wage paid to white workers is the same as that paid to
their black counterparts (a null hypothesis) and that because of
the large size of the workforce it would be impractical to attempt
to determine the race and wage of each employee. A court faced
with the challenge that blacks are paid less on the average will test
the null hypothesis that the average wages of the two groups are
the same against the alternate hypothesis that on average the
white workers are paid more. Because the alternate hypothesis
postulates that a first statistical parameter will exceed a second,
attention will be focused on column I in Appendix A.80 A random
sample of white employees and a random sample of black employ-
ees are taken, and the mean wage is calculated for each. The z-
score81 for the difference of these means"2 is then examined. If it is
not greater than 1.645,83 it lies in the unshaded region of accept-
ance, and the null hypothesis stands, no case of discrimination
against the black employees having been established. If it is
greater than 1.645, it lies in the shaded region, and the null hy-
pothesis should be rejected in favor of the alternate, thus estab-
lishing a prima facie showing of discrimination.
Having established the statistical foundation for hypothesis
testing, the remainder of this Article focuses on its use in estab-
lishing a prima facie case of employment discrimination and the
superiority of this statistical theory to the techniques currently
used by courts and the EEOC.
null hypothesis will stand. Finally, if the alternate hypothesis merely postulates a difference,
then attention i1 focused on columns III and IV, and the appropriate threshold values are
chosen from them. If the relevant t-or z-score falls within the shaded area (below the
threshold value given in column III or above that given in column IV), the null hypothesis is
to be rejected and the alternate accepted. If, however, it lies in the unshaded region, then
the null hypothesis will stand.
80. See note 79 supra.
81. Assume that each sample contains over 30 workers.
82. The formula used to calculate the z-score for the difference between two means,
discussed in the section on Means, see notes 120-29 & accompanying text infra, is:
+ -2
n, n2
where x,, si and n. are the mean, standard deviation and size of the first sample respec-
tively, and i,, s, and n, are those respective parameters of the second sample.
83. The number 1.645 is the threshold value for the z-score in column I.
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Proportions
Employers can discriminate against specific minorities by de-
veloping a workforce where the proportion of minority members is
significantly smaller than the proportion of minority members in
the population of available employees, 8 4 or by establishing criteria
for employment or promotion which tend to exclude a greater pro-
portion of minority workers than those of other groups within the
population. 5 Requiring a complete mathematical mirroring of the
relevant proportions is not feasible given the circumstances sur-
rounding the construction of a workforce. Rather, the issue is
whether the disparity between these proportions is so great as to
warrant an inference of discrimination. Formulae for calculating t-
and z-scores will be introduced and tailored to each specific situa-
tion, enabling a court, through the use of hypothesis testing, to re-
solve the issue and determine whether a prima facie case has been
established.
Test for Proportions
To determine whether a specific minority is significantly un-
derrepresented in a defendant's workforce, a null hypothesis-that
no significant difference exists between the proportion of minority
employees in the workforce and the proportion of minority workers
in the population of available employees-is tested against the al-
ternate hypothesis that the proportion of minority employees in
the workforce is significantly less than that of the population. The
t- or z-score formula for this test is:
x 
n
or equivalently:
86
Zx - np
S-np(1 - p)
84. See note 19 supra.
85. See note 20 supra.
86. See FREUND & WILLAmS, supra note 16, at 324.
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where x is the number of minority members, n is the total number
of employees in the defendant's workforce, and p is the proportion
of the population that are minority members. If this score falls be-
low the appropriate threshold value found in column II of Appen-
dix A, '87 the null hypothesis is to be rejected in favor of the alter-
nate hypothesis. If, however, the t- or z-score lies above the
appropriate threshold value, the null hypothesis will stand.
Illustration 3: Assume that of a workforce of 5,000 (n), 36%
or 1,800 employees are black (x), while the proportion of blacks in
the population of available employees is 40%. Then:
Z 1,800 - (5,000)(0.40) 1,800 - 2,000 -200 = _
V(5,000)(0.40)(1 - 0.40) N/ 1,200 34.64
Because this value is less than -1.645,"s the null hypothesis postu-
lating no significant difference between the relevant proportions
must be rejected in favor of the alternate, and a prima facie case of
discrimination is established.
It should be noted from the results in Illustration 3 that the
court would be at least 95% certain that blacks were significantly
underrepresented in the defendant's workforce even though the
disparity between the proportion of blacks in the defendant's em-
ploy (0.36) and the proportion of blacks in the population of avail-
able employees (0.40) was only 4%. Comparing percentage levels
alone is not sufficient to determine whether such a disparity is sig-
nificant89 except in the most extreme circumstances.90 Even then,
87. Because the alternate hypothesis postulates that the sample proportion is less than
the population proportion, the appropriate threshold value is found in column II. See note
79 supra.
88. Because n is greater than 30, the appropriate threshold value is the z-value -1.645.
See Appendix A infra.
89. Consider an employer with a workforce of 200 (n) of which 72 (x), or 36% are
black. Let the proportion of blacks in the population of available employees be 0.40. Thus,
the proportion of blacks in the workforce and in the population in this example match those
in Illustration 3. Then:
72 - (200)(0.40) 72 - 80 -8 -115
V(200)(0.40)(1 - 0.40) V 48 6.93
This score is greater than the threshold value -1.645. Therefore, the null hypothesis stands,
and, contrary to the conclusion reached in Illustration 3, no case that blacks are signifi-
cantly underrepresented in this workforce has been established.
90. In New Orleans Pub. Serv., Inc. v. Brown, 507 F.2d 160, 163-64 (5th Cir. 1975), the
charge filed by the EEOC alleged that the defendant employed 695 blacks (x) out of a total
workforce of 3,052 (n), and the relevant population (p) was 45% black. It was clear to the
court that the disparity between the proportion of blacks in the workforce, 695/3,052 =
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the theory of hypothesis testing will reach the same result.91
Difference in Proportions Test
Employers may also discriminate against a specific minority
by establishing criteria for employment or promotion which ex-
clude or disqualify a greater proportion of that minority than those
of other groups. 2 When complete information is available with re-
spect to the percentages of those in the relevant groups who were
excluded, then the conclusion of whether such discrimination ex-
ists is reached merely by comparing these percentages and observ-
ing whether the specific minority members were excluded in
greater proportions.3s Absent such complete information, the infor-
mation at hand must be used in making this determination. If only
sample data are available, the disparity between the sample pro-
portions must be examined and a determination must be made as
to whether it is large enough to warrant an inference of
discrimination.
The null hypothesis that there is no significant difference in
the proportions of the relevant minority and nonminority groups
disqualified or excluded by the challenged criteria is tested against
the alternate hypothesis that the relevant minority members are
excluded in greater proportions. The z-score94 for this test is:
xL _ x 2  9
n, n 2
where xL is the number of minority applicants rejected, n1 the total
number of minority applicants, x2 the number of nonminority ap-
plicants rejected, and n2 is the total number of nonminority appli-
22.8%, and the proportion of blacks in the population was significant by mere inspection of
figures.
91. In New Orleans Pub. Serv., Inc. v. Brown, 507 F.2d 160 (5th Cir. 1975), see note 90
supra, the relevant x, n, and p values yielded a z-score of -24.69, which is less than the
threshold value -1.645. This implies that the null hypothesis fails in favor of the alternate
hypothesis that the proportion of blacks in the New Orleans Public Service workforce is
significantly less than the proportion of blacks in the population.
92. See note 20 supra.
93. See, e.g., Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 329-30 (1977); Donnell v. General
Motors Corp., 576 F.2d 1292, 1296-97 (8th Cir. 1978).
94. Without further restrictions on the characteristics of the population, each sample
must contain at least 30 observations.
95. See FREuND & WELImms, supra note 16, at 332, problem 5; HUNTSBERGER, supra
note 1, at 302.
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cants. The proportion of applicants who would have been rejected
assuming that the null hypothesis is true is represented by p, mak-
ing (1 - p) the representative of the proportion of the applicants
who would have passed. The proportion represented by p equals
the total number of applicants rejected divided by the total num-
ber of applicants:
X, + X2  96P=
If this z-score is greater than 1.645,97 the null hypothesis is re-
jected; if less than 1.645, no case of discriminatory treatment has
been established.
Illustration 4: Assume that a written aptitude test is admin-
istered to 800 women (n) and 1,200 men (n2) as part of a com-
pany's hiring procedure. Assume further that 400 women (x1) and
500 men (x2) fail the test, and a Title VII action is brought against
the company alleging that the test had a discriminatory impact on
women. Testing the null hypothesis that the test was not discrimi-
natory against the alternate hypothesis that the proportion of wo-
men failing is significantly greater than the proportion of men
failing,
400+ 500 900
P 800 + 1,200 2,000 0.45.
Thus, 1 - p = 0.55, and
400 500
Z 800 1,200 0.500 - 0.417 _ 0.083 361
A/(o0.55).5) + (0.45)(0.55) 0.556 0.023
800 1,200
Because this score is greater than 1.645, the null hypothesis is re-
jected, and a prima facie case of discrimination is established.
Unlike a simple comparison of proportions which might suffice
in extreme cases,"' this test can be relied on in all instances. 9 The
96. Id.
97. Because the alternate hypothesis postulates that the first sample proportion is
greater than the second sample proportion, the appropriate threshold value is found in col-
umn I of Appendix A. See note 79 supra.
98. In United States v. Commonwealth of Va., 454 F. Supp. 1077 (E.D. Va. 1978), 145
blacks took a written aptitude test for Virginia State trooper positions in 1973-1975 (n.),
and 101 failed (x1). During this period, 655 whites took the same test (n,), and 160 failed
6x0). The court saw by mere inspection of the data that nearly 70% of the blacks failed
while less than 25% of the whites failed. This disparity was of great enough significance for
the court to pass the burden of proving the test's validity to the defendants.
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difference in proportions test also can be used to determine
whether the proportion of a given minority in a defendant's
workforce in lower paying and less desirable jobs is significantly
greater than the proportion of nonminority employees in compara-
ble positions.100
The EEOC Four-Fifths Rule
Instead of the difference in proportions test, the EEOC and
some courts have adopted a standard known as the "four-fifths
rule" 10 1 in which a difference between two proportions is not con-
sidered significant if the proportion of the successes of the relevant
minority sample is at least four-fifths, or 80%, of the proportion of
the successes of the nonminority sample. Thus, if rm is the propor-
tion of the relevant minority sample that satisfied the challenged
employment or promotion criteria or are in better paying or more
desirable jobs, and rw is the nonminority sample proportion in that
99. Assume that an aptitude test is administered to 80 women and 120 men, and 40 of
the women and 50 of the men fail. The relevant proportions of the women and men who
failed this test match those in Illustration 4, as does the null hypothesis representative of
the proportion who would have failed. Yet in this example:
40 50
80 120 0.500 - 0.417Z =
(0.45)(0.55) + (0.45)(0.55) V O.005156
80 120
0.083 1.15.
0.072
Because the z-score is less than 1.645, the null hypothesis must stand as there has been no
showing of a significant disparity between the proportions.
100. In Abron v. Black & Decker Mfg. Co., 439 F. Supp. 1095, 1102 (D. Md. 1977), the
court found, inter alia, that 52 of the 117 blacks employed by the defendant were assigned
to the less desirable departments, while 593 of the 2,926 whites employed were so assigned.
Using these facts:
52 + 593 645 0212,
117 + 2,926 3,043
1 - p 1 - 0.212 = 0.788, and
52 593
Z 117 2,926 0.24 6.0.
)/(0.212)(0.788) + (0.212)(0.788) 0.04
117 2,926
Because this score was greater than 1.645, a prima facie case of discrimination was
established.
101. 41 C.F.R. § 60-3.4(D) (1979). See also, Detroit Police Officers' Ass'n v. Young, 446
F. Supp. 979, 1007 (E.D. Mich. 1978), rev'd, 608 F.2d 671 (6th Cir. 1979); Moore v. South-
western Bell Tel. Co., 19 FEP Cases 232, 234 (E.D. Tex. 1978).
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position, then the EEOC would rule that no case of discrimination
had been advanced if rm/rw is greater than 80%. Conversely, the
EEOC would find a prima facie case of discrimination if the ratio
is less than 80%.
This rule can easily lead to inaccurate results. In Illustration
4, for example, 400 out of 800 women and 700 out of 1,200 men
who took the challenged test passed. Therefore, rm = 400/800 =
0.500, and rw = 700/1,200 = 0.583. Because the ratio rm/rw =
0.500/0.583 = 0.86 (greater than 80%) the EEOC would conclude,
contrary to the weight of the evidence under hypothesis testing,
that the employment test described did not have a disparate im-
pact on women.102 In some cases the weight of the evidence may
not establish a prima facie case of discrimination under hypothesis
testing, but the ratio rm/rw will nonetheless be less than 80%.101
The difference in proportions test clearly is superior to the less
precise four-fifths rule, and the latter should be discarded in favor
of the more sophisticated mathematical technique.
The X2 Test
The difference in proportions test, albeit sound, is nonetheless
limited in that it cannot be used in cases considering more than
two proportions. When there are more than two relevant groups in
the population 04 or more than two relevant categories of place-
ment of employees or potential employees,10 5 the difference in pro-
portions test is inapplicable, and the X 2 (Chi Square) Test 06
should be employed.
102. This limitation of the four-fifths rule is analyzed thoroughly by Professor Shoben.
Comment, Differential Pass-Fail Rates in Employment Testing: Statistical Proof Under
Title VII, 91 HARv. L. REv. 793, 805-12 (1978). See also id. at 809 n.59 (Employer B).
103. Id. at 809 n.56 (Employer D).
104. At times, consideration may have to be given to more than two distinct groups
within the population. See, e.g., Western Addition Community Organization v. Alioto, 340
F. Supp. 1351 (N.D. Cal. 1972) (court considered three groups: whites, blacks and Mexican-
Americans).
105. The categories considered in the difference in proportions test subsection have
been in pairs such as pass-fail or hired-excluded. See notes 92-100 and accompanying text
supra. Yet at times, consideration may have to be given to various levels or types of jobs,
and more than two categories would have to be investigated. See, e.g., Garrett v. R.J. Reyn-
olds Indus., Inc., 81 F.R.D. 25, 34-35 (M.D.N.C. 1978) (job categories examined included
officials and managers, professionals, technicians, office and clerical, craftsmen (skilled), and
operators (semi-skilled)).
106. See FREuND & WuLLws, supra note 16, at 328-32; HUNTSBERGER, supra note 1,
345-53, 355-60.
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The X 2 Test is an extension of the techniques of testing pro-
portions previously discussed.10 7 As with the previous tests dis-
cussed, a null hypothesis-no significant discrepancy exists in the
treatment of the various groups considered-is tested against an
alternate hypothesis-that a significant disparity exists to warrant
an inference of such a discrepancy-by calculating a number or
score (in this case X 2) and determining whether it lies above or
below a specific threshold value. To begin the calculation, repre-
sentative values for the relevant categorical proportions are deter-
mined.'08 This is accomplished by taking the total number of em-
ployees or applicants in each category considered, and dividing by
the total number of employees or applicants. These representative
proportions are then multiplied by the number of employees or ap-
plicants in each group to yield the respective expected values. 09
These are the expected numbers of members from each relevant
group who would populate each of the considered categories if the
null hypothesis was true. They are compared to the actual or ob-
served numbers of members from the respective groups populating
the respective categories and, if the disparity between these values
is great enough, the null hypothesis will be rejected in favor of the
alternate hypothesis.
The X 2 disparity is computed by taking the squares of the
differences between the corresponding expected and observed val-
ues in each category with respect to each group, dividing by the
respective expected value, and adding all of these scores.1 1 If this
number is greater than the appropriate X1 threshold value found
in Appendix A,"" the null hypothesis is rejected, and a prima facie
case of disparate treatment has been advanced. If the number is
less than the threshold value, the null hypothesis will stand.112
The relevant threshold value is determined by multiplying one
less the number of groups considered by one less the number of
107. In fact, the X2 Test also may be used in lieu of the difference in proportions test
when there are only two groups and two categories being considered. See FREUND & WIL-
LIAMS, supra note 16, at 333 (problem 6). However, the preference is to use the difference in
proportions test whenever possible because it is considered a more simple and direct proce-
dure to employ, understand, and explain. It is important to note, however, that the differ-
ence in proportions test is not a more mathmatically sound theory than the X2 Test.
108. See FREUND & WiLLIAmS, supra note 16, at 328-29.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 330.
111. Id. at 331.
112. Id.
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categories to attain the appropriate number of degrees of free-
dom11 and then extracting the corresponding value from column V
in Appendix A. 114
Illustration 5: Assume that a defendant company adminis-
tered a preemployment test to 5,200 whites, 3,200 blacks, and 1,600
Spanish-surnamed individuals and 3,000 whites, 2,000 blacks, and
1,000 Spanish-surnamed individuals failed the test. Assume further
that the test was challenged as having a disparate impact on mi-
norities. From this information, three groups (white, black, Span-
ish-surnamed) and two categories (pass, fail) are considered. The
following table can be constructed:
Spanish- Total in
Groups: whites blacks surnamed Category
Categories:
Passed 2,200 1,200 600 4,000
Failed 3,000 2,000 1,000 6,000
Total in
Group: 5,200 3,200 1,600 10,000 Total
Let p be the representative proportion of those who would
pass and q of those who would fail (the relevant categorical pro-
portions), assuming the null hypothesis to be true.
- total number of applicants who passed = 4,000 = 0.40.
total number of applicants -10,000
q = total number of applicants who failed = 6,000 = 0.60.
total number of applicants 10,000
The number of whites, blacks and Spanish-surnamed individuals
expected to pass and fail the test (the expected values) are deter-
mined by multiplying these representative proportions by the
number of applicants in each group:
The number of whites expected to pass = (0.40) (5,200) = 2,080.
The number of whites expected to fail = (0.60) (5,200) = 3,120.
The number of blacks expected to pass = (0.40) (3,200) = 1,280.
The number of blacks expected to fail = (0.60) (3,200) = 1,920.
113. Id. at 330.
114. These threshold values, like the others in Appendix A, correspond to a level of
significance of 0.05.
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The number of Spanish-surnamed individuals expected to pass =
(0.40) (1,600) = 640.
The number of Spanish-surnamed individuals expected to fail =
(0.60) (1,600) = 960.
These expected values are tested against the corresponding ob-
served values in the sample. Thus
X1 = the sum of (expected values-observed values)' 115
expected values
- (2,080 - 2,200)2 + (3,120 - 3 000)2 + (1,280 - 1,200)2
2,080 3,120 1,280
(1,920 - 2,000) 2  (640 - 600)2 (960 - 1,000)2
+ 1,920 + 640 + 960
14,400 + 14,400 + 6,400 + 6,400 + 1,600 +
2,080 3,120 1,280 1,920 640 960
6.92 + 4.62 + 5.00 + 3.33 + 2.50 + 1.67 = 24.04.
Because there are three groups and two categories, one less the
number of groups multiplied by one less the number of categories,
(3 - 1) x (2 - 1) = 2 x 1, yields two degrees of freedom. Thus,
the relevant threshold value is 5.991.116
Here, the X2 value of 24.04 is greater than 5.991. The null
hypothesis that there is no significant disparity in the proportions
therefore is rejected in favor of the alternate hypothesis that the
test does have a disparate impact.1 7 By observation one can see
that whites did better than expected while blacks and Spanish-
surnamed individuals did worse than anticipated. Therefore a
prima facie case of discrimination against nonwhites has been
established.
As before, inspection of the data and percentage comparisons
alone may lead to inaccurate results.1 8 Additionally, combining
115. See note 110 supra.
116. See note 113 supra. This value is attained from column V of appendix A infra.
117. When using the X2 Test, the alternate hypothesis postulates only that a signifi-
cant difference exists; no group is delineated as favored. However, if such a disparity has
been demonstrated, mere inspection of the data will indicate where the advantages and dis-
advantages lie.
118. Consider, for example, a preemployment test having been administered to 520
whites, 320 blacks, and 160 Spanish-surnamed individuals, and 300 whites, 200 blacks, and
100 Spanish-surnamed people failed. Assume further that this test was challenged in a Title
VII action as having a discriminatory impact on minorities. Because 1,000 people took the
challenged test (520 + 320 + 160), and 600 failed (300 + 200 + 100) while the remaining
400 passed, the representative proportions of those who were expected to pass and fail, p
and q respectively, are:, 00  600
p 1,000 0.40, and q 10.60,
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groups or categories so as to produce two of each, and then using
the difference in proportions test, may cause inaccurate results.119
The X2 Test is a sound method for determining whether a dispar-
ity in treatment of specific groups is large enough to warrant an
inference of discrimination and should always be used if there are
more than two groups or two categories to be considered.
Means
Examination and comparison of proportions is -not the only
way hypothesis testing can be used in establishing or rebutting a
prima facie case in a Title VII action. Courts also have compared
relevant minority and nonminority sample means in order to de-
termine whether discrimination in employment exists.1 20 The focus
matching the representative proportions in Illustration 5. Thus, the expected values are:
whites passing. (0.40)(520) = 208.
whites failing:. (0.60)(520) = 312.
blacks passing:. (0.40)(320) = 128.
blacks failing: (0.60)(320) = 192.
Spanish-surnamed individuals (0.40)(160) = 64.
passing
Spanish-surnamed individuals (0.60)(160) = 96.
failing:
Thus:
X2 = (208 - 220)2 (312 - 300)2 (128 - 120)2
208 + 312 + 128
+ (192 - 200)2 + (64 - 60)2 + (96 - 100)2192 64 96
= 0.692 + 0.462 + 0.500 + 0.333 + 0.250 + 0.167
= 2.404.
As in Illustration 5, there are two degrees of freedom. Thus, the threshold value is again
5.991. However, contrary to the results in Illustration 5, X2 is less than the threshold value,
implying that the null hypothesis will stand, and no case of discrimination has been
established.
119. Assume that a preemployment test is administered to 100 whites, 100 blacks, and
100 Mexican-Americans, and that 50 whites, 35 blacks, and 50 Mexican-Americans pass,
while the remaining applicants failed. Computing )(', one gets a value of 6.061. Comparing
it to the relevant threshold value, 5.991, one can conclude that a significant disparity exists.
Inspection of the data shows that it is blacks who were disadvantaged.
However, if blacks and Mexican-Americans were combined to form one group of minor-
ity applicants, the difference in proportions test can be used in comparing the proportion of
white failures (50/100 or 0.50) with the proportion of minority failures (115/200 or 0.575).
The z-score obtained is 1.23 which is less than the relevant threshold value 1.645. Thus, one
would be unable to reject the null hypothesis and conclude that blacks were being
disadvantaged.
120. See notes 121-24 infra.
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is usually on the differences between sample means of salaries,121
increments, 22 seniority or tenure before promotions, 23 and test
scores and merit ratings124 among the workforce within the defen-
dant company in order to determine whether a particular minority
was being discriminated against.
Use of hypothesis testing in these instances entails consider-
ing a null hypothesis that there is no significant difference between
the means of the relevant minority and nonminority population
groups, which is tested against an alternate hypothesis postulating
that a significant difference exists disadvantaging the minority em-
ployees. Such disadvantage with respect to salaries, increments
and merit ratings is that the minority mean is significantly less
than the corresponding nonminority mean, and with respect to
tenure before promotion, that it is significantly greater than its
nonminority counterpart.
Standard deviations, as well as means, must be extracted from
the relevant samples, since the z-score is:
-1 - 125
S S2
./ + sL
n, n2
where R, and x2 are the means of the respective minority and
nonminority samples extracted from the workforce, s, and q2 are
the respective standard deviations2 ' of these samples, and n, and
n 2 are the respective sizes of each sample. The threshold values are
found in the same manner as previously discussed in the difference
121. See, e.g., James v. Stockham Valves & Fittings, 559 F.2d 310, 327 (5th Cir. 1977),
cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1034 (1978); Watkins v. Scott Paper Co., 530 F.2d 1159, 1165 (5th Cir.
1976).
122. See, e.g., Johnson v. University of Pittsburgh, 359 F. Supp. 1002, 1011 (W.D. Pa.
1973).
123. See, e.g., United States v. Georgia Power Co., 474 F.2d 906, 910 (5th Cir. 1973);
Kyriazi v. Western Elec. Co., 461 F. Supp. 894, 910 (D.N.J. 1978).
124. See, e.g., James v. Stockham Valves & Fittings, 559 F.2d 310, 316 n.4, 332 (5th
Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1034 (1978); Sagers v. Yellow Freight Sys. Inc., 529 F.2d
721, 726-28 (5th Cir. 1976).
125. Each sample must contain at least 30 observations, because without imposing fur-
ther restrictions on the behavior of the relevant statistical parameters, only z-scores can be
used and small sized samples are not considered. See FREUND & WELLMsS, supra note 16, at
292-94.
126. See note 68 supra.
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in proportions section.12
Illustration 6: Assume that an employer has a workforce
consisting of 100 female and 200 male workers in comparable jobs
and that the 100 females received pay raises in an increment
which averaged $850 based upon various objective and subjective
criteria. The standard deviation of these 100 raises was $270. The
male workers, with their increments purportedly based on the
same criteria, received an average raise of $940, with a standard
deviation of $260.
In testing the null hypothesis that this $90 difference in the
increments is not significant enough to warrant an inference of dis-
crimination against females against the alternate hypothesis that
the difference is significant enough to warrant that inference, the
relevant z-score is computed to be:
850 - 940 -90 -90z .... .-2.75.
(270)2 + (260)2 /729 + 338 32.7
100 200
Because -2.75 is less than -1.645,128 the null hypothesis is re-
jected in favor of the alternate, and a prima facie case of discrimi-
nation has been established.
129
Conclusion
Statistical evidence, like any other kind of evidence, is rebut-
table. While its value ultimately depends on the circumstances sur-
rounding each case,130 the techniques developed in this Article,
when properly applied, are irrefutable in what they demonstrate.
When led to a rejection of the null hypothesis at a level of signifi-
cance of 0.05, a court can be at least 95% confident that a dispar-
ity of treatment of the relevant groups exists. It is, of course, for
the courts to determine whether the application of this analysis
and theory is correct and proper, but if they so determine, then the
127. See notes 92-100 & accompanying text supra. See also notes 76, 79 supra.
128. The threshold value of -1.645 is found in column II, because the alternate hy-
pothesis postulates that women received a significantly smaller increment than men, and
therefore the first value will be less than the second. See note 79 supra.
129. Comparisons between more than two sample means also can be made to deter-
mine whether significant differences exist which disadvantage specific minorities, but a dis-
cussion of the methods involved is beyond the limited scope of this Article. See FREuND &
WILLIAM, supra note 16, at 344-60; HUNTSBERGER, supra note 1, at 320-44.
130. See note 13 & accompanying text supra.
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evidence flowing from the statistics should not be discounted or
dismissed. Rather, in light of the increasingly sophisticated treat-
ment of Title VII actions, statistical analysis must be viewed as
both a proper and necessary tool for the establishment or refuta-
tion of the prima facie case.
APPENDIX A
Column I II I1 IV V
5\~ % /N 2 1/%
t.05 -t.05 
-t.025  t 025  X '.05
z.05 -z.05 
-Z.025 z.025
Degrees Degrees
of 
ofFreedom Freedom(t'05) ('-45) ('t.025) (4025) X2. 05
1 6.314 
-6.314 -12.706 12.706 3.841 12 2.920 -2.920 
-4.303 4.303 5.991 23 2.353 -2.353 -3.812 3.812 7.815 34 2.132 -2.132 -2.776 2.776 9.488 45 2.015 
-2.015 -2.571 2.571 11.070 56 1.943 
-1.943 
-2.447 2.447 12.592 67 1.895 -1.895 -2.365 2.365 14.067 78 1.860 -1.860 -2.306 2.306 15.507 89 1.833 -1.833 -2.262 2.262 16.919 910 1.812 -1.812 -2.228 2.228 18.307 1011 1.793 -1.793 
-2.201 2.201 19.675 1112 1.782 -1.782 -2.179 2.179 21.026 1213 1.771 -1.771 -2.160 2.160 22.362 1314 1.761 -1.761 
-2.145 2.145 23.685 1415 1.753 -1.753 -2.131 2.131 24.996 1516 1.746 
-1.746 
-2.120 2.120 26.296 1617 1.740 
-1.740 
-2.110 2.110 27.587 1718 1.734 
-1.734 
-2.101 2.101 28.869 1819 1.729 -1.729 -2.093 2.093 30.144 1920 1.725 -1.725 -2.086 2.086 31.410 2021 1.721 -1.721 
-2.080 2.080 32.671 2122 1.717 -1.717 
-2.074 2.074 33.924 2223 1.714 
-1.714 -2.069 2.069 35.172 2324 1.711 -1.711 
-2.064 2.064 36.415 2425 1.708 -1.708 -2.060 2.060 37.652 2526 1.706 -1.706 -2.056 2.056 38.885 2627 1.703 -1.703 -2.052 2.052 40.113 2728 1.701 -1.701 
-2.048 2.048 41.337 2829 1.699 -1.699 
-2.045 2.045 42.557 29
(z.05) (-z05) (-z.02f) (z.025)inf. 1.645 
-1.645 -1.960 1.960 inf.
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